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Aiming Right at You: Group versus  
Individual Clientelistic Targeting in Brazil 
Héctor Bahamonde 
Abstract: Do parties target individuals or groups? Although this ques-
tion is fundamental to understanding clientelism, the literature does not 
offer an answer. This paper argues that, depending on certain conditions, 
brokers target individuals when they are identifiable, and groups when 
brokers need to rely on the spillover effects of clientelism. Both identifi-
ability and spillovers depend on individual poverty, group poverty, and 
political competition. Though the theory I outline focuses on targeting, I 
also argue that structural factors, such as the density of the poor, should 
be considered in the vote-buying literature. Structural factors are one of 
the few observables upon which brokers can base their decision regard-
ing investing in clientelism. Using survey and census data from Brazil, 
the paper exploits variations in personal incomes within contexts of 
differing levels of municipal poverty. I find that political parties engage 
in segmented or ad-hoc strategies, targeting individuals when identifiabil-
ity is high, and groups when there are economies of scale. Importantly, 
non-poor individuals can also be offered clientelism. 
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There is no agreement on when, how, and why parties choose to aim 
clientelist practices at individuals or groups.1 The distributive politics and 
vote-buying literatures have traditionally pursued one of two approaches. 
The former has mostly focused on group targeting, usually districts or 
provinces (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Khemani 2015; and Calvo and 
Murillo 2004), showing that incumbent parties deliver public-sector jobs 
or construction projects contingent on the support of groups of people. 
The latter has typically focused on individuals and their characteristics, 
such as their socio-economic or electoral profiles. Substantively, howev-
er, it is not clear when or why clientelist brokers use either strategy. 
In fact, the decision to investigate group-based and/or individual-
based targeting seems to be attributable to distinct research designs and 
agendas, rather than theory. For example, ethnographers generally focus 
on individuals, while others have traditionally focused on groups (Scott 
1972; Auyero 2000; Szwarcberg 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; and Gonzá-
lez-Ocantos et al. 2012).2 
What is most concerning, however, is that it is relatively assumed or 
implied that individual and group clientelist targeting strategies are inter-
changeable, when they are clearly not. Individuals pertaining to groups 
and individuals by themselves have different incentives to defect to the 
incumbent. For instance, individuals belonging to larger groups have 
greater incentives to defect (Stokes 2005),
 
while individuals who are 
personally targeted have fewer incentives to defect (Auyero 2000).
 
Antic-
ipating this, brokers adjust their strategies accordingly. In the first in-
stance, brokers deal with low-informational environments that increase 
principal-agent problems. In the second instance, brokers – who know 
their clients better – are able to leverage this knowledge, reducing the 
probability of defection. However, these differences have not been sys-
                                                 
1  I am grateful to Robert Kaufman, Daniel Kelemen, Richard Lau, Paul Poast, 
Geoffrey Wallace, Douglas Jones, Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Juan Pablo Lu-
na, Jorge Bravo, Eric Davis, Adam Cohon, Edwin Camp, Luciana Oliveira Ra-
mos, Giancarlo Visconti, William Young, Johannes Karreth, and the reviewers 
and editor of JPLA. I also thank participants of the Latin American Studies As-
sociation 2014 conference, the Southern Political Science Association 2015 
meeting, the Western Political Science Association 2015 meeting, and the 2014 
Graduate Conference at the Political Science Department, Rutgers University. 
Any errors that remain, of course, are my responsibility. This work was partially 
funded by the Center for Latin American Studies at Rutgers University. I am 
grateful to the School of Arts and Sciences and the Department of Political Sci-
ence for their travel grants. 
2  I wish to thank Ezequiel González-Ocantos for this suggestion. 
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tematized in the literature. In the present paper, I propose a framework 
that explains when it is more efficient to target groups or individuals. 
Particularly, by focusing on brokers, the paper advances an argu-
ment about the decision process regarding whom to target. The crux of 
the argument is that this decision is a function of three factors: individu-
als’ discount factors explained by income levels, the incentives of clien-
telist brokers to rely on spillover effects caused by the nesting structure 
of individuals (that is, whether individuals are nested in poor or non-
poor contexts), and brokers’ incentives to engage in clientelism explained 
by higher electoral pressures and political competition. 
Overall, I share Carlin and Moseley’s (2015: 14) opinion that 
“[e]xisting research looks almost exclusively at individuals’ socio-eco-
nomic and, specially, electoral profiles [and] [y]et our knowledge of who 
parties target remains incomplete.”
 
The present paper seeks to contrib-
ute to this issue by incorporating both structural and individual factors 
that foster clientelism in the same theory. Analytically, the structure of 
the argument (and the empirics) allows for disentangling the effects of 
“being poor” and “living in a poor area.” Another important implication 
of the argument is that I am able to suggest why parties that adopt clien-
telism as a strategy, target their resources to both poor and non-poor 
individuals, an empirical regularity that, to the best of my knowledge, has 
been unexplored so far. 
Perhaps the area in which there is the most agreement among 
scholars is on the relationship between poverty and vote-buying (Calvo 
and Murillo 2004; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Kitschelt 2000; and Kitschelt and 
Altamirano 2015).
 
For example, Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004), 
Stokes et al. (2013), and Nazareno, Brusco, and Stokes (2008) explained 
that since the poor derive more utility from immediate transfers than the 
uncertain returns associated with future policy packages, clientelist politi-
cal parties only target the poor. In fact, Weitz-Shapiro explained that 
“[a]lmost universally, scholars of clientelism treat and analyze [this] prac-
tice as an exchange between politicians and their poor clients” (Weitz-
Shapiro 2014: 12; my emphasis). 
However, this canonical predictor has recently been contested 
(Hicken 2007: 55).
 
Szwarcberg (2013: 32) “challenges the assumption 
[that brokers] with access to material benefits will always distribute goods 
to low-income voters in exchange for electoral support,” while Gonzá-
lez-Ocantos et al. (2012) and Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) found 
that income (measured at the individual level) had little or no effect on 
vote-buying. In fact, Figure 1 shows that non-poor individuals in Brazil 
did receive clientelist offerings. Why would brokers target non-poor individuals? 
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And relatedly, why does contemporary scholarly work report null findings for pov-
erty, traditionally the most important predictor of vote-buying? I present an argu-
ment where individual income alone is not relevant (similarly, see Weitz-
Shapiro 2012: 568). What matters is how noticeable individuals are. 
Wealthier individuals living in poor contexts and poor individuals living 
in non-poor contexts are more identifiable, increasing their respective 
probabilities of being targeted. I also contend in this article that, in low-
information environments, brokers use these kinds of observables to 
reduce the probability of defection of their clientele. 
Another often-considered contextual factor in the literature is the 
size of the community in which clientelism takes place. Large-sized 
communities impose severe principal-agent problems. Stokes (2005: 323) 
explained that the “community structure” mediates the incentives to 
defect. Large communities make voters more anonymous, increasing 
their probability of defection. In fact, Rueda (2017: 164) found that in 
Colombia vote buying is more effective in contexts of small polling plac-
es.  
Figure 1. Individual Wealth and Vote-Buying in Brazil 
 
Note:  Following the advice of Córdova (2008) and Córdova and Seligson (2009, 
2010), different socio-economic variables in The Latin American Public Opin-
ion Project (2010) dataset were used to construct a relative wealth index 
(RWI). With this information, in addition to the frequency of clientelism question 
(clien1), the figure shows that clientelist brokers target individuals at all levels 
of income. 
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Several scholars have then argued that brokers prefer smaller groups 
because individuals nested in small communities should defect less 
(Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2006: 10; 
and Magaloni 2008: 67. See also Bratton 2008, for Nigeria, and Gin-
gerich and Medina 2013: 456, for Brazil). Yet, even when brokers might 
prefer to target small communities (with fewer voters relative to large 
communities), it is not clear how political parties gain enough electoral 
returns, especially considering that clientelism is expensive. 
Vote-buying is an expensive strategy (Zarazaga 2014: 35),
 
and more 
so when clients are individually targeted.3 Stokes (2005: 317) argued that 
brokers develop skills that allow them to infer whether individual clients 
in small-sized communities voted for their party by looking at them in 
the eyes. Gay (1993, 1998) documented similar findings for the Brazilian 
case. This strategy requires brokers to sustain close relationships over 
time with their clients in a personal and individualized way. Knowing the 
clients’ needs, delivering them benefits, monitoring their political behav-
ior (and punishing them in case of defection), all in an individualized 
fashion, makes this strategy an extremely expensive choice – and it be-
comes even more expensive as more individuals are added to the bro-
ker’s portfolio. 
The cost of individual targeting increases linearly with the size of 
the targeted population (Hicken 2007: 56).
 
This intuition is important 
because the brokers’ production-possibility frontier cannot be shifted 
upwards either. Since the number of brokers is a depletable resource, at 
some point party machines run out of brokers, implying that monitoring 
capacities are bounded. In fact, Auyero (2000: 74) explained that the 
capacity brokers have to deliver benefits is “finite,” and “only for a re-
stricted number of people.” However, and despite this constraint, bro-
kers still have incentives to secure a large number of votes. Yet, the liter-
ature explains that clientelism should decrease in large communities. 
However, it is hard to conceive that brokers will stop being clientelist 
just because the size of the population is large. A priori, it seems a 
missed opportunity for brokers to let go of a large number of votes. In 
fact, survey data for the Brazilian case indicate that inhabitants of large, 
medium, and small municipalities are targeted in virtually the same pro-
portion (Speck and Abramo 2001: 2).
 
This article explains that when 
                                                 
3  Dixit and Londregan (1996: 1147) explained that brokers track “constituents’ 
likes and dislikes, compulsively participating in a spectrum of events [such as] bap-
tisms and bar mitzvahs, weddings and funerals [and even, holding] daily meet-
ings with constituencies [even] after nine o’clock [hearing] what anyone wished 
to tell [them]” (My emphasis). 
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brokers need to secure large amounts of electoral support, especially 
when political competition is high, they turn to group-targeting strate-
gies, relying on the spillover effects of clientelism. In these contexts, 
clientelism mobilizes electoral support from “actual” and “potential” 
beneficiaries, minimizing the costs of clientelist targeting while maximiz-
ing electoral benefits, a mechanism that I explain later on in the paper. 
Civic associations might help solve some of the challenges large-
sized groups present to brokers. As low-information environments pre-
vent brokers from really observing individual electoral behavior (Zara-
zaga 2014: 35), they usually resort to alternative methods that allow them 
to make safer inferences. For example, Schaffer and Baker (2015: 1094) 
argued that clientelism is “socially multiplied” as party machines target 
individuals “who are opinion-leading epicenters” in informal situations, 
or “partisan networks” (Calvo and Murillo 2013), in what has been called 
“organization buying” (Stokes et al. 2013: 250–251).4 If parties buy 
“turnout” (Nichter 2008), then they will most probably target associa-
tions too, as “citizens immersed in clientelist networks [...] have a higher 
probability of voting than the rest” (Carreras and Castaneda-Angarita 
2014: 7). I acknowledge the positive relationship between group mem-
bership and clientelism. However, what has not been explored yet is 
whether clientelism is explained by association membership itself, or by 
the fact that poor individuals usually address their problems as a group, 
since otherwise it would be too costly to solve them individually. If this 
is the case, group membership should be spuriously related to clien-
telism. While I find that group membership does have a positive effect 
on clientelism, I find that structural contexts that foster group-targeting 
have even more explanatory power.5 
Moving forward, Weitz-Shapiro’s (2012) important paper found 
that in several Argentine municipalities, higher levels of political compe-
tition and low socioeconomic levels fostered higher levels of clientelism. 
In her paper, losses are conceptualized in terms of “moral costs.” Evi-
dence for these types of costs has been presented in the literature very 
recently. For example, Carlin and Moseley (2015) argued that citizens 
                                                 
4  Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015: 16) explained that when “parties lack their 
own brokerage networks [they seek] to capitalize on organizational networks 
instead.” Similarly, Rueda (2015: 13) argued that parties tend to target very spe-
cific civic associations of “seniors and associations of single mothers, organiz-
ing trips to recreational centers outside the city where all their expenses are 
covered.” Paradoxically, the stronger the civic society (that is, the more orga-
nized it is), the more clientelism there is. 
5  These results are presented in Figure A4. 
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endowed with more democratic values feel more “moral repugnance” to 
clientelism. Vicente (2014) showed that vote-buying practices have an 
“immoral/illegal connotation,” while González-Ocantos et al. (2012) 
found that individuals wanting to avoid social stigma usually do not give 
truthful answers when asked directly about clientelism. Building on this 
literature, I contend that when political competition is high, clientelism 
will be higher in contexts where poor individuals live in poor economic 
contexts. 
When Do Parties Target Individuals and When 
Groups? 
Table 1 presents four ideal types in four quadrants; cases where individu-
als are highly identifiable; that is, non-poor individuals living in poor 
areas (Q1), and poor individuals living in non-poor areas (Q4). Identifia-
bility in these cases reduces the cost of defection, permitting clientelist 
brokers to closely target individuals. While individual targeting is more 
expensive, it is also safer (compared to group targeting). The table also 
shows cases where individuals are hard to identify; that is, poor individu-
als living in poor areas (Q2), and non-poor individuals living in non-poor 
areas (Q3). In these cases, voters are more anonymous, making direct 
individual-based targeting and monitoring more costly. Since brokers still 
have incentives to seek electoral support, they engage in group targeting 
by relying on the spillover effects of clientelism. In these cases, the ef-
fects of vote-buying disseminates by mobilizing targeted voters and la-
tent untargeted (but potential) clients. This form of targeting is cheaper 
but more uncertain. 
Table 1. Strategy Set: Group versus Individual Targeting 
 Non-Poor Individuals Poor Individuals 
High Competition Poor Areas, identifiable, 
individual targeting. 
Poor Areas, spillover effects, 
group targeting, cheap vote-
buying. 
Low Competition Non-Poor Areas, group 
targeting, expensive vote- 
buying, lack of checks and 
balances, embezzlement. 
Non-Poor Areas, identifia-
ble, individual targeting. 
Source:  Author’s compilation. 
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Individual Targeting 
This is the safest bet a broker can make, but also the most expensive 
one, as it requires brokers to have sustained closed relationships with 
their clients. For instance, Zarazaga (2014: 26) stated that “brokers have 
detailed information about their neighborhood and clients’ needs.” 
Keeping track of every single client (and their respective needs) is an 
expensive strategy. After all, as Auyero (2000: 73) put it, brokers are 
“problem solvers.” Importantly, the kind of care given ranges from ma-
terial needs to symbolic and immaterial necessities, making clientelism a 
relationship based on “trust, solidarity, reciprocity, caring, and hope.” 
Such broker-client symbiosis is both material and personal-intensive, 
making it very costly. As an investment, however, it pays off electorally. 
The same detailed information brokers have about their clients’ needs is 
then used to infer coercively (or know directly) the electoral behavior of 
their respective clientele, administering punishments or rewards accord-
ingly (Stokes 2005: 317). 
The transaction costs of clientelism are reduced by targeting identi-
fiable clients. In 2009, Luna et al. (2011) made extensive participant ob-
servations in several campaigns, accompanying a number of candidates 
for several months in their campaigns for the legislative election in Santi-
ago de Chile. With one incumbent, we spent considerable time on the 
ground, traveling in her district. On several times, as we drove through-
out the district in her personal car, the candidate was able to recall who 
the head of household was (including his/her name), what her district 
office had contributed to solve their needs, and whether the household 
members were on good terms with her.6 Importantly, the economic 
diversity of the district provided a number of useful observables. In non-
poor areas, poor houses with an unpainted wall, a rusty front yard fence, 
a two-story house with a bodega market on the first, a household with a 
broken window, or a junk diesel truck aground in the front yard, among 
others, provided distinctive points of reference. Identifiability, as an 
observable, made these receivers less anonymous, raising their cost of 
defection and making them more prone to cooperate. Table 1 portraits 
individuals living in these heterogenous contexts in Q4. 
Households in Q4, being more noticeable, stand out in their respec-
tive contexts, making it easier for brokers to notice whether they need 
construction materials, whether there are wakes to which they could 
contribute flowers or birthday parties to which they could bring cakes. In 
                                                 
6  The actual gender of the candidate might have been changed for confidentiality 
purposes. 
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addition, it makes their possible defection more obvious and memorable 
for the brokers. In summary, higher levels of visibility supply brokers 
with good-quality information about their clients.7 In addition, when 
political contestation is low, the demand for votes is less astringent, 
shaping brokers’ incentives to target in a more accurate, less massive 
fashion, identifiable and particularized individuals, not groups. 
The capacity brokers have to identify potential clients not only 
comes from third-party sources, as the “organization buying” propo-
nents explain (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Rueda 2015 and Stokes 
et al. 2013). In a similar account, others have pointed out that brokers 
are also “reliable neighbors” (Zarazaga 2014: 38); that is, members of the 
same community of targeted individuals. Acknowledging this approach, 
the argument presented in this article contends that brokers have incen-
tives to expand their immediate local networks by colonizing visible 
targets outside of their own proximate neighborhood. By conceptualiz-
ing brokers as active political entrepreneurs who seek new supporters 
outside of their immediate context, the proposed framework comple-
ments other accounts, as presented in Szwarcberg (2013: 32) or Zarazaga 
(2016: 681), where brokers are neighborhood party agents. Clientelist 
entrepreneurship can be performed directly or indirectly. For instance, 
Auyero (2000: 65–66) described the situation of Cholo, a member of the 
inner circle of one of the brokers in Buenos Aires, Argentina, who visit-
ed “other poor neighborhoods of the area adjacent to” the place where 
the broker (and himself) lived, to spread news about some government 
plan, the governor, and the Peronist party, but importantly, also report-
ing to the broker any unattended material needs he had noticed. This 
illustrates how, via different channels, brokers expand their client portfo-
lio outside of their immediate community. 
An important implication is that individual poverty does not play a 
role by itself. Non-poor individuals living in poor areas (Q1) are also 
noticeable, and consequently, possible targets as well. Political competi-
tion shifts the demand for votes upwards. As elections become more 
contested, brokers need to secure even higher levels of electoral support. 
Since newly elected representatives are more likely to bring new people 
to their machines, brokers are also interested in seeing their candidates 
elected. Consequently, brokers will have even more incentives to engage 
in clientelism when political competition is high. In these cases, political 
competition is high enough to even mobilize non-poor individuals in a 
                                                 
7  Importantly, poor households do not need to be close to each other, but visible 
enough. 
  50 Héctor Bahamonde 
 
clientelist way. Since these votes are more expensive to purchase (given 
decreasing marginal utility from income, see Stokes 2005: 321), this strat-
egy is less preferred. However, costly clientelism is worth the investment 
given the risk of losing the election. 
Group Targeting 
This is the least accurate targeting strategy, but also the cheapest one 
available to brokers. It leverages the spillover effects provided by larger 
concentrations of individuals who share the same socio-economic back-
grounds. This strategy is less accurate because it mobilizes electoral sup-
port from “actual” clients (individuals who have actually been targeted), 
and “potential” clients (individuals who have not received benefits yet). 
It is preferred when poor individuals are nested in poor areas (Q2), or 
vice-versa (Q3). In these cases, individuals are masked by their environ-
ments, which means that identifiability is hard to achieve. As explained 
before, identifiability facilitates individual targeting, an important factor 
in reducing the probability of defection of targeted clients. When indi-
viduals are hard to identify, however, individual targeting becomes pro-
hibitively expensive. Yet, brokers who still need to secure electoral sup-
port do not opt out of clientelism and instead turn to group targeting. 
Auyero (2000: 65) described the case of Alfonsina in Argentina. Al-
fonsina was part of the broker’s inner circle and got a job as a cleaning 
lady in a public school. As the broker explained to her, before getting the 
job, Alfonsina had to be patient because as a member of “the circle,” she 
was in the pool of potential beneficiaries; it was only a “matter of time” 
until she could get the job. The idea of expectations and hope are im-
portant. Auyero explained that the 
hope of a job serves as important glue within the inner circle. Alt-
hough not everyone is employed at the municipality, the fact that 
someone gets [a] job has an important demonstration effect. (Auyero 
2000: 65; my emphasis) 
Building on this intuition, two ideal types are suggested: actual and po-
tential beneficiaries. The former receive particularistic benefits “today” 
and vote for the broker’s candidate “tomorrow,” while the latter do not 
receive benefits “today” (in the expectation of receiving them in the 
future) but still vote for the broker’s candidate “tomorrow.” 
Group targeting is cost-effective because it mobilizes two types of 
voters at the cost of investing in just one (i.e. the “actual”). Actual bene-
ficiaries want to remain actual beneficiaries since they want to keep re-
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ceiving benefits; thus, they keep supporting the broker’s candidate. In 
turn, potential beneficiaries want to become actual beneficiaries, but are 
uncertain when that might happen; as a result, they also support the 
broker’s candidate. In this sense, from the broker’s perspective, this 
strategy reduces the sunk costs by half, multiplying the gross benefits by 
two. In other words, the broker’s reputation of a “problem solver” dis-
seminates twice as fast relative to individual targeting. It is in this sense 
that this is a massive (but less precise) form of clientelist targeting. 
Given that potential clients support the broker’s candidate in the 
absence of current inducements, brokers need to effectively calibrate the 
timing when potential beneficiaries become actual beneficiaries. In other 
words, brokers need to infer the discount factors of their potential cli-
ents, making it expensive for them to defect. Reputation, as a form of 
capital, is fundamental for brokers since “voters prefer to support [bro-
kers] with a reputation for delivering because they are a more reliable 
source of future rewards” (Zarazaga 2014: 24). However, potential cli-
ents are also interested in investing in their reputation. From their per-
spective, they know that the flow of resources is dependent on the bro-
kers’ electoral success. Also, they do not know whether new brokers 
might have access to fewer resources or distribute them to other people. 
For them, the cost of switching brokers (or defecting) is very high since 
it also involves building relationships of confidence with another broker 
from scratch, which is costly. Hence, the incentives are for the broker to 
deliver benefits before it is too late, while the incentives for the potential 
client are to support the broker’s candidate. 
Since it does not matter what type an individual is, both actual and 
potential beneficiaries keep voting for the broker’s candidate. While cost-
effective, group targeting is less accurate since brokers hope to mobilize 
potential beneficiaries only indirectly; that is, by targeting actual benefi-
ciaries. This makes this strategy a fragile one. However, besides the repu-
tation costs described above, low-income voters have additional incen-
tives to support the broker’s candidate. This is described in Q2. Given 
that the poor are risk-averse, potential beneficiaries are better-off waiting 
(and voting for the broker’s candidate) than defecting. In the same vein, 
but on a slightly different subject, Magaloni (2008: 20) posited that the 
Mexican PRI lasted as long as it did not because of electoral fraud but 
because voters supported the “known devil.” Economic underdevelop-
ment played a fundamental role in this equilibrium as well. Finally, higher 
levels of electoral contestation force brokers to engage in this less accu-
rate, but massive form of clientelist targeting, leveraging (1) the incentive 
structure of potential clients to support the candidate even in the ab-
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sence of current inducements, and (2) the higher levels of risk aversion 
poor individuals have. 
Importantly, vote-buying is also targeted to non-poor individuals 
nested in non-poor groups (Q3). Vote-buying has decreasing returns to 
scale in non-poor individuals. That is, wealthier individuals derive fewer 
advantages from a bag of rice relative to poorer individuals (Kitschelt 
2000).
 
Anticipating this, brokers will not offer the same benefits to 
wealthy individuals, but will customize the type of offerings. This distinc-
tion is important, since most of the literature assumes that clientelist 
practices decrease when individual incomes rise. However, that approach 
does not explain the counterintuitive empirical regularity depicted in 
Figure 1; that is, non-poor individuals get targeted too. Why are non-poor 
individuals targeted? This article seeks to contribute to the literature by 
explaining that brokers make their offers more attractive to non-poor 
individuals by offering goods that are relatively more expensive. This is 
more likely when districts are wealthier. 
While buying votes from non-poor individuals costs more, brokers 
in non-poor areas have more resources to spend. Along the same lines, 
Hicken (2007: 55) questioned the implicit assumption that the broker’s 
vote buying funds remain fixed; stating that “a candidate’s capacity to 
buy votes increases commensurate with increases in average incomes.” 
In other words, higher levels of economic development not only raise 
personal incomes, but also shifts the broker’s vote-buying capacities 
upwards. Similar evidence has been found in the Philippines (Schaffer 
2004). The link between higher incomes and vote buying is particularly 
relevant for Brazil, since its electoral laws allows political parties to get 
unlimited funds (Abramo and Speck 2001: 14), enabling brokers greater 
capacities to buy more expensive votes. 
Besides having more resources to spend, brokers in politically un-
contested districts have fewer political constraints, facilitating the spend-
ing of expensive clientelism. In Q3 it is suggested that lower levels of 
political contestation allow brokers to spend on more expensive means 
of clientelism. Uncompetitive districts lack proper de facto mechanisms of 
checks and balances, giving local incumbents more “room to move,” 
allowing them to divert local resources into more expensive means of 
targeting. I call this “embezzlement clientelism.” Given these relatively 
more expensive costs, however, I expect this form of clientelism to be 
less frequent. In a dynamic similar to Q2, potential clients also support 
the broker’s candidate, hoping to become actual beneficiaries. However 
– and unlike poor clients in Q2 – non-poor clients in Q3 (both actual 
and potential) have smaller discount factors. That is, non-poor individu-
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als – given their relatively higher incomes – have more “patience.” This 
is especially important for brokers. In practice, potential clients’ timing 
constrains are more elastic, putting less pressure on brokers to deliver 
benefits in the short run. 
Case Selection, Research Design, and Data 
Analyses 
I. Data 
This section empirically tests the theoretical proposition stated in Table 1 
– that is, the combined effects of individual income, of being nested in 
poor/non-poor communities, and being exposed to different levels of 
political competition – on receiving clientelist benefits. Brazil is a good 
case because its poverty structure is such that it is possible to find low-
income individuals nested in non-poor areas (and vice versa). This case is 
also interesting from an institutional perspective. The Brazilian electoral 
system incentivizes clientelism. Several factors such as multimember 
districts with open lists, and the institution of the candidato nato,8 “clearly 
[makes] Brazil one of the most personalistic systems of democratic gov-
ernance” (Kitschelt and Altamirano 2015: 257), which might foster high-
er levels of clientelism. In fact, Gingerich (2014: 290) found that vote-
buying drastically changed electoral results, concluding that “[v]ote bro-
kerage can still pay electoral dividends in contemporary Brazil.” 
To test this hypothesis, I use survey data from 2010 from The Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) (2010).9 Though the 
LAPOP survey provides a question for income, people who are some-
what better off than their neighbors but live in poor areas may not “feel” 
poor. If this is the case, it could confound the results. Additionally, when 
answering the questioner, individuals might not want to reveal their true 
incomes (either because they are too low or too high). Following the 
advice of Córdova (2008) and Córdova and Seligson (2009, 2010), a 
                                                 
8  “[R]ule that removed parties’ control over the nominations process and let an 
electoral legislator decide to run on any party ticket.” See Kitschelt and Altami-
rano (2015: 257). 
9  “I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major 
supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Unit-
ed Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.” The sample consists 
of five strata representing the five main geographical regions of Brazil. Each 
stratum was further sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
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relative wealth index (RWI) was constructed (see also Santos and Villato-
ro 2018). Using principal component analyses, the index measures wealth 
based on actual assets weighted by how common these assets are. Dif-
ferent indices were constructed for urban and rural contexts. Figure 1 
plots the distribution of the index. 
Figure 2. Distribution of the Density of the Poor 
 
Note:  Employing Brazilian census data from the IBGE (2010), the figure shows the 
percentage of individuals who live on less than half of the minimum wage in a 
given municipality. While individual income is measured using the relative 
wealth index (in Figure 1), the variable plotted here is used to measure eco-
nomic development at the group level. Due to statistical reasons explained in 
this paper, the variable had to be dichotomized at its median (29 percent). 
However, in separate statistical analyses shown in Table A3 (weighted model), 
the variable is used without dichotomizing it, showing the same results. 
II. Main Variables of Interest 
To measure economic development at the group level, I constructed a 
variable that I call “the density of the poor” following a strategy similar 
to that of Weitz-Shapiro (2012). The variable, which is plotted in Figure 
2, measures the degree of poverty at the municipal level. Using infor-
mation from the 2010 Brazilian census,10 a semi-continuous variable was 
constructed to measure the percentage of individuals who live on less 
than half of the minimum wage in a given municipality. Given that the 
                                                 
10  Official data comes from the Bureau of Statistics of Brazil IBGE. 
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municipality of residence for each individual in the LAPOP survey is 
recorded, I was able to merge the census percentage with the LAPOP 
dataset. It is important to stress that the unit of analysis is the individual, 
and that this variable captures the economic context in which each indi-
vidual lives. Just like other scholars in the past have tested the effect of 
being nested in rural areas,11 this paper focuses on another class of con-
textual variable. Although the density of the poor group was originally a 
semi-continuous variable (that is, a percentage), it had to be dichoto-
mized at the median (29 percent) to be able to construct a matched sam-
ple, which I justify and explain below. Figure 2 shows the continuous 
distribution dichotomized at the median (dotted line). 
Finally, to measure political competition, I again follow Weitz-Sha-
piro (2012). Using official electoral data from the 2008 municipal elec-
tions,12 I constructed a variable that measures the percentage of seats 
that are not controlled by the mayor’s party in a given municipal council. 
III. Matched Design 
There is a built-in lack of relationship between “being poor” and “living 
in a poor municipality,” confirming that Brazil is in fact a good case to 
test this theory. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that the unmatched/ 
raw dataset already has embedded low levels of correlation between 
these two variables (r = -0.44).13 
I was able to break this relationship down further using matching 
methods. Matching is a two-stage process. In the first stage, the analyst 
“preprocesses” the data, seeking to break any systematic relationship 
between, in this case, the density of the poor and the relative wealth 
index RWI (Ho et al. 2011). Matching does so by deleting observations 
for which similar observations cannot be found.14 The idea is to obtain a 
good covariate balance, as in Figure A3 (in the Appendix), to then esti-
mate any appropriated statistical model.15
 
From a statistical standpoint, 
                                                 
11  See, for example, Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004) and Stokes (2005). Both 
studies used the log of population, which is a proxy for urban/rural. 
12  Data from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. 
13  The figure shows that, for both the matched and raw datasets, “being poor” 
and “living in a poor municipality” are not confounded, as it is possible to find 
poor individuals living in non-poor areas, and vice versa. 
14  The final procedure matched 761 individuals living in the low-density poverty 
condition with 676 individuals living in the high-density poverty condition. 
15  The idea is that the propensity of being exposed to the “high” density of the 
poor condition (or “propensity score”) has a similar distribution in both “treat-
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preprocessed datasets are less model-dependent (Ho et al. 2007),16 and 
prevent analysts from making extreme counterfactuals.17 The prepro-
cessed data used in the matching approach has 54 municipalities, while 
the raw data used in the generalized propensity score (GPS) approach 
(which I explain below) also has 54. Figure 3 lists the municipalities and 
shows which ones are considered “high” or “low” in terms of the density 
of the poor after the dichotomization process. The figure also shows that 
there is considerable variance in income/RWI in both high- and low-
poverty density conditions (bubbles).18 
One could argue that dichotomizing the density of the poor variable 
at the median is an arbitrary decision. While there have been theoretical 
advances regarding general treatment effects regimes for continuous or 
semi-continuous response doses (Imai and Dyk 2004; and Hirano and 
Imbens 2004), algorithms with the ability to match on continuous treat-
ment variables are not common. In order to obtain covariate balance in a 
non-parametric way (as matching does) but without dichotomizing the 
density of the poor, I also use the original (that is, continuous) density of 
the poor variable to construct a generalized propensity score GPS (Im-
bens 2004; Guardabascio and Ventura 2014; and Imai and Ratkovic 
2014).19 The score is used to weight each observation in the model.20 
  
                                                                                                    
ed” and “control” groups. It is important to note that, despite the language, I 
do not claim any causal relationship in this paper. 
16  Table A2 and Table A1 in the Appendix provide summary statistics for both 
the matched and raw datasets. Tables were generated using the stargazer R pack-
age. See Hlavac (2015). 
17  King and Zeng (2005). The matching routine used was the full matching routine 
(Hansen 2004; Rosenbaum 2010), via the MatchIt R package (Ho et al. 2011). 
18  Figure A2 in the Appendix shows the frequency of individuals by municipality 
in both raw and matched datasets. 
19  To generate the weighting vector, I used the CBPS R package (Fong et al. 
2018). 
20  Besides matching on and weighting by the RWI index, I also included the 
following variables to match on/weighting by: municipal opposition, municipal 
population and individual involvement in civic associations. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Observations by Municipality, Wealth Index and 
Density of the Poor 
 
Note:  The figure shows the municipalities in the analyses (matched set). For every 
municipality, the figure shows (1) the number of inhabitants (Y-axis), and (2) 
whether the municipality is considered having a high or low density of the poor. 
High-density municipalities have more than half of their inhabitants living on 
less than half of the minimum wage. The figure also shows (3) individual 
wealth indexes (bubbles). 
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IV. Model Specification 
The dependent variable is clientelism. To measure it, I use the question 
that asks if a candidate or someone from a political party offered the 
respondent something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in 
return for her/his vote or support. Subjects could answer that this had 
happened often, sometimes, or never. Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) and 
Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) used the same dataset and outcome 
variable. As they explained, the question did not ask whether respond-
ents took the offer, hence it should not be an important source of social 
desirability bias (González-Ocantos et al. 2012). For statistical and sub-
stantive reasons, I dichotomized this variable, combining the alternatives 
often (n = 91) and sometimes (n = 150), leaving never (n = 1,196) un-
changed.21 
The following control variables were considered in the statistical 
analyses. Perception of corruption was included to hold constant the 
effect of respondents who declared clientelist activity when in reality they 
were referring to corruption scandals.22 Brokers usually target civic asso-
ciations. Following Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015: 28), an additive 
index to measure civic participation (Political Involvement) was creat-
ed.23 Some studies have also found group size to be important (Stokes et 
al. 2013). A variable to measure population size at the municipal level 
was constructed using Brazilian census data. 
Following the convention in statistical studies of clientelism, an ur-
ban/rural dummy was also included. Some have argued that parties tar-
get their own supporters (Dixit and Londregan 1996, and Cox and 
Mccubbins 1986), moderate opposers (Stokes 2005),
 
or unmobilized 
supporters (Nichter 2008). To keep these effects constant, a variable to 
capture party identification (Political Id.) was included. Higher levels of 
democratic support should be negatively associated with clientelism. To 
control for that, a variable measuring democratic support was included. 
González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson (2014) found that 
schooling plays a negative role on clientelism; hence, I control for educa-
tion too. 
  
                                                 
21  These numbers come from the matched dataset. 
22  I thank Cesar Zucco for this suggestion. 
23  This variable was constructed by adding the frequency of attendance at reli-
gious meetings, community improvement meetings, and political party meet-
ings (variables cp6, cp8 and cp13, respectively). 
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V. Functional Form 
Observations are clustered on a number of important factors such as 
levels of municipal political competition, municipal poverty, and munici-
pal population size. In order to account for these clustering effects, I use 
a “generalized estimating equations” approach. GEE were introduced by 
Liang and Zeger (1986) to fit clustered, repeated (that is, correlated), and 
panel data. This method is especially efficient when the data are binary 
(Hanley et al. 2003).
 
GEE models are similar to random effects models 
(Gardiner, Luo, and Roman, 2009), in that they allow observations to be 
nested in hierarchical structures. This method requires analysts to pa-
rameterize the working correlation matrix. While Hedeker and Gibbons 
(2006: 139) stated that “the GEE is robust to misspecification of the 
correlation structure,”24 Hardin and Hilbe (2013: 166) pointed out that 
“[i]f the observations are clustered (not collected over time), then [...] the 
exchangeable correlation structure” is the most appropriate working 
correlation matrix. Given that the data do not follow a panel but rather a 
clustered structure, the “exchangeable” correlation matrix was specified 
in all models. 
While this method is very flexible, GEE estimates remain uninter-
pretable in practice (Carlin et al. 2001),
 
making regression tables useless 
from a substantive standpoint. In this case, the problem is even more 
severe due to the interactive nature of the hypothesis being tested in this 
paper, which is a parameter for the multiplicative term between the vari-
ables wealth index, political competition, and density of the poor.25
 
Methodologists agree about “not interpret[ing] the coefficients on the 
constitutive terms,” as they lack substantive meaning (Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder 2006: 77). These problems become more complex when it 
comes to generalized models, as a number of challenges arise.26 Given 
that cross-partial derivatives are not advisable either, simulation methods 
                                                 
24  Carlin et al. (2001: 402) argued that “[r]elatively minor differences in estimates 
may arise depending on how the estimating equations are weighted, in particu-
lar within the generalized estimating equation (GEE) framework.” Westgate 
and Burchett (2017) and Gardiner, Luo, and Roman (2009, 227) made the same 
point. 
25  Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006: 74) offer the same advice. 
26  As Ai and Norton (2003) explained, “(1) the interaction effect could be non-
zero, even when the estimation says it is zero, (2) the statistical significance of 
the interaction effect cannot be tested with a simple t-test on the coefficient of 
the interaction term, (3) the interaction effect is conditional on the independent 
variables, [...] and (4) the interaction effect may have different signs for differ-
ent values of covariates.” 
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are required (Zelner 2009). In particular, I follow the simulation ap-
proach introduced in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). This proce-
dure samples via simulation from the point estimates, generating a new 
and larger distribution. In more detail, taking the single estimated param-
eters (that is, the regression coefficients), I constructed a distribution of 
estimated values for each coefficient. Relying on the central limit theo-
rem, with enough sampling draws, the new simulated distribution is a 
transformation that approximates with a great degree of precision the 
(uninterpretable) coefficients. Subsequently, means and uncertainty 
measures can be constructed for each of these distributions. From a 
substantive standpoint, simulation methods also allow for the sampling 
of new distributions at different values of the independent variables. 
This will be important in simulating the expected value of clientelism for 
different “profiles,” such as non-poor individuals nested in high-poor 
dense municipalities in contexts of high political competition, among 
other profiles. 
Since it is “impossible to evaluate conditional hypotheses using only 
the information provided in traditional results tables” (Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder 2006: 76), I have focused instead on the substantive results 
from the simulation methods. However, I still present the raw results in 
Table A3 in the Appendix.27 Analogous to Table 1, in Figure 4 I simulate 
the predicted probabilities of being targeted using both the matched and 
weighted/GPS models. The horizontal panel depicts simulations for the 
“upper” (“non-poor,” 75 percent) and “lower” (“poor,” 25 percent) 
quartiles of the wealth index. In turn, the vertical panel shows the simu-
lated values for the maximum (100 percent) and minimum (43 percent) 
values of the municipal opposition index. Each quadrant shows simula-
tions for individuals nested in poor municipalities (high density of the 
poor), and non-poor municipalities (low density of the poor). Each pro-
file shows two simulated probability distributions (with 95 percent con-
fidence intervals): one for the matched sample, and one for the 
weighted/GPS model.28 The idea is to show that the decision of dichot-
omizing the density of the poor variable at its median gives substantively 
                                                 
27  Table generated via the texreg R package. The first column shows the estimates 
for the matched dataset, while the second column shows the results for the 
GPS-weighted model. Virtually all coefficients have the same size and sign. 
28  In the case of the weighted/GPS model, which does not use the dichotomized 
variable, I use the continuous version of the size of the poor variable, where 
“low density” represents the lower quartile while “high density” represents the 
upper quartile. 
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exact results than using the continuous version of that variable via the 
GPS analysis. 
VI. Results 
All quadrants in Figure 4, regardless of the approach used,29 suggest that 
brokers engage in individual targeting when individuals are identifiable, 
and in group targeting when brokers need to rely on the spillover effects 
of clientelism. 
In Q1, clientelism is more likely (with a 26 percent probability) in 
situations where non-poor individuals are nested in poor groups (i.e. 
where the density of the poor is “high”)30 and living in electorally con-
tested municipalities. As I have argued, these types of individuals are still 
targeted because they are more identifiable. For instance, a similar indi-
vidual (same quadrant) who is nested in a non-poor group (“low” density 
of the poor), and consequently harder to identify, has a much lower 
probability of being targeted (7 percent). Similarly, individuals in Q4, 
such as poor individuals nested in non-poor areas (“low” density of the 
poor), and living in lowly contested municipalities, are more likely to be 
targeted (13 percent) relative to harder-to-identify individuals who live in 
poor areas (11 percent). In Q1, higher levels of electoral competition put 
heavier pressure on brokers to mobilize more expensive ways of clien-
telism. These pressures decay when incumbents face lower levels of 
electoral contestation (Q4).  
Figure 4 shows in Q2 that clientelism is more likely (25 percent) in 
situations where poor individuals are nested in poor groups (“high” 
density of the poor). As I have argued here, brokers will have incentives 
to engage in group targeting, taking advantage of the spillover effects of 
clientelism, leveraging the electoral support of potential clients by mobi-
lizing actual clients. This is especially the case when the incumbent is 
seriously contested. Individuals that are similar (same quadrant), but 
nested in a non-poor group (“low” density of the poor), have a much 
lower probability of being targeted (12 percent). Individuals in Q3, who 
are non-poor individuals nested in non-poor areas (“low” density of the 
poor), and those living in lowly contested municipalities, are more likely 
to be targeted (24 percent) than similar individuals nested in non-poor 
areas (5 percent). Areas with higher levels of economic development also 
allow brokers to have more resources to distribute in what it was called 
                                                 
29  Although there are statistical differences, the differences across datasets are 
proportional. 
30  Matched sample. 
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“embezzlement clientelism.” Lowly contested municipalities give brokers 
and political incumbents more room to allocate and distribute more 
expensive goods. However, and as theoretically expected, given that the 
net costs of this form of clientelism are higher, this is the least likely 
form of clientelism (reflected in the lower probabilities). 
Figure 4. Simulated Expected Values of Clientelism 
 
Note:  After fitting the models shown in Table A3, this figure shows the predicted 
probabilities of being targeted under different scenarios, with 95 percent confi-
dence intervals. Substantively, the figure emulates the theoretical predictions 
shown in Table 1. Clientelism is higher when non-poor individuals are nested 
in poor groups (“high” density of the poor) in highly contested municipalities 
(Q1), when non-poor individuals are nested in non-poor groups (“low” density 
of the poor) in scarcely contested municipalities (Q3), when poor individuals 
are nested in poor areas in highly contested municipalities (Q2), and when 
poor individuals are nested in non-poor areas in scarcely contested municipali-
ties (Q4). For every quadrant, estimates from both the matched and weighted 
datasets are shown. The idea is to show that the decision to dichotomize the 
density of the poor variable at its median (as shown in Figure 2) gives substan-
tively exact results than using the continuous version of that variable via the 
GPS analysis. 
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Discussion 
This paper has argued that when poor individuals live in poor areas, 
brokers engage in group targeting relying on the spillover effects of cli-
entelism. This strategy mobilizes targeted and untargeted clients by dis-
seminating the broker’s reputation of delivering benefits among potential 
beneficiaries. In a similar way, non-poor individuals clustered in non-
poor areas are also targeted. In these cases, higher levels of economic 
development not only raise personal incomes, but also shift the broker’s 
vote-buying capacities upwards. Lower levels of political contestation 
allow these more expensive forms of clientelism. However, in heteroge-
neous areas, brokers adapt their strategies and execute clientelism in a 
different way, relying on how identifiable individuals are. Identifiability 
raises the cost of defection by making their households more memora-
ble, making receivers more likely to cooperate. 
Incentives to offer or take clientelist offerings are not guided solely 
by structural or individual factors. This paper has suggested that both are 
necessary to understand clientelism better. Clearly, pressures to partake 
in clientelism, an expensive and uncertain strategy, rise as political com-
petition raises (from 18 percent to 25 percent).31 However, the outcomes 
of this strategy differ largely depending on whether brokers face homo-
geneous or heterogeneous groups of individuals. Each one provides a 
different cost/benefit structure for both clients and brokers. Finally, I 
hope that the literature considers that groups and individuals provide 
different incentives to both brokers and clients, and hence, this distinc-
tion should be incorporated to better understand clientelism. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Summary Statistics: Raw Sample 
 
N
 
M
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n 
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ct
l(
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P
ct
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75
) 
M
ax
 
Clientelism  1,483 0.171 0.376 0 0 0 1 
Wealth 
Index  1,483 -1.543 0.846 -3.05 -2.261 -0.843 0.899 
Municipal 
Opposition  1,483 81.761 11.821 43 75 89 100 
Density of 
the Poor  1,483 2.435 1.12 1 1 3 4 
Municipal 
Population  1,483 5.393 2.841 1 3 8 10 
Urban  1,483 0.86 0.347 0 1 1 1 
Political 
Involvement 
Index  
1,483 1.792 1.619 0 0 3 9 
Support for 
Democracy  1,483 5.426 1.682 1 4 7 7 
Party Id.  1,483 5.939 1.15 1 6 6 12 
Perception 
of Corrup-
tion  
1,483 2.027 1.003 0 1 3 3 
Years of 
Education  1,483 9.398 3.857 1 6 12 18 
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Table A2. Summary Statistics: Matched Sample 
 N
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Clientelism  1,437 0.168 0.374 0 0 0 1 
Wealth Index 1,437 -1.557 0.811 -3.05 -2.261 -0.866 0.899
Municipal 
Opposition  1,437 81.912 11.749 43 75 89 100 
High Density 
of the Poor  1,437 0.47 0.499 0 0 1 1 
Municipal 
Population  1,437 5.384 2.792 1 3 8 10 
Urban  1,437 0.86 0.347 0 1 1 1 
Political 
Involvement 
Index  
1,437 1.784 1.613 0 0 3 9 
Support for 
Democracy  1,437 5.417 1.684 1 4 7 7 
Party Id.  1,437 5.934 1.16 1 6 6 12 
Perception of 
Corruption  1,437 2.029 1 0 1 3 3 
Years of 
Education  1,437 9.359 3.843 1 6 12 18 
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Table A3. Generalized Estimating Logistic Equations: Clientelism 
 Matched Weighted 
(Intercept) 1.404 2.958 
 (1.968) (2.691) 
Wealth Index 1.374 1.320 
 (0.990) (1.209) 
Municipal Opposition -0.040 -0.061 
 (0.025) (0.032) 
High Poor Density -6.550**  
 (2.399)  
Municipal Population -0.115* -0.101 
 (0.048) (0.053) 
Urban -0.091 -0.077 
 (0.401) (0.416) 
Political Involvement 0.046 0.047 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
Support for Democracy -0.056 -0.051 
 (0.046) (0.048) 
Party Id. -0.082 -0.087 
 (0.053) (0.052) 
Perception of Corruption 0.240** 0.267** 
 (0.088) (0.089) 
Years of Education 0.051* 0.054** 
 (0.021) (0.020) 
Wealth Index * Municipal Opposition -0.018 -0.013 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Wealth Index * High Poor Density -2.509  
 (1.319)  
Municipal Opposition * High Poor Density 0.085**  
 (0.030)  
Wealth Index * Municipal Opposition * High Poor 
Density 
0.029  
 (0.016)  
Density of the Poor  -1.992* 
  (0.921) 
Wealth Index * Density of the Poor  -0.555 
  (0.372) 
Municipal Opposition * Density of the Poor  0.024* 
  (0.011) 
Wealth Index * Municipal Opposition * Density of 
the Poor 
 0.005 
  (0.004) 
Num. obs. 1,437 1,483 
Num. clust. 54 54 
Note:  ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Clustered standard errors at the municipality 
level. First column shows the estimates using the matched dataset. Second 
column shows the estimates of the weighted model (the generalized propensi-
ty score was omitted in the table). Both models are logit GEE. 
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Figure A1. Distribution of Pre- and Post-Matching Observations by Wealth 
Index and Density of the Poor 
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Figure A2. Frequency of Individuals by Municipality, Pre- and Post-
Matching Deletion 
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Figure A3. Pre- and Post-Matching Balance: Distribution of Propensity 
Scores 
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Figure A4. Simulated Expected Probability of Being Targeted: Political 
Involvement and Population Size  
 
Note:  Using the estimations in Table A3, the figure shows the probability of being 
targeted at different values of political involvement (a) and population size at 
the municipal level (b). The figure suggests that being nested in high-poor 
density areas contributes substantially more to explaining clientelism.  
Figure A4 shows a plot divided in two panels. Panel a shows the simu-
lated expected probabilities (with 95 percent confidence intervals) of 
being targeted at different levels of political involvement. As the blue 
lines suggests, individuals who participate in civic associations have high-
er probabilities of being targeted. This is in line with findings in previous 
research (Schaffer and Baker 2015; Carreras and Castaneda-Angarita 
2014: 7; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015: 16; 
and Rueda 2015). However, once I decompose these effects, being nest-
ed in high-poor density areas contributes substantially more to the mod-
el. These differences are statistically significant. Panel b shows the prob-
ability (with 95 percent confidence intervals) of being targeted at differ-
ent increments of the size of the population. In line with the literature, I 
also see that this relationship is negative (Stokes 2005: 323; Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2006: 10; Magaloni 2008: 67; Rueda 2017; Bratton 2008; and 
Gingerich and Medina 2013: 456). However, the effect of being nested in 
high-poor density municipalities outperforms the effect of population 
size, suggesting spillover effects. 
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Apuntando Justo a Ti/Ustedes: Blancos Clientelares Grupales e 
Individuales en Brasil 
Resumen: ¿Los partidos apuntan a grupos o individuos? Aunque esta 
pregunta es fundamental para entender el clientelismo, la literatura no 
ofrece una respuesta clara. Este trabajo argumenta que, dependiendo de 
ciertas condiciones, los compradores de votos apuntan a individuos 
cuando pueden identificar a sus blancos, y a grupos cuando necesitan 
utilizar los efectos indirectos que provee la lógica del clientelismo. Tanto 
la identificación individual como los efectos indirectos del clientelismo 
grupal, dependen de los niveles de pobreza individual, pobreza grupal, y 
los niveles de competencia partidista. Aunque la teoría de este trabajo se 
concentra en los blancos clientelares (grupales e individuales), también 
argumenta que factores estructurales, como la densidad de pobreza, 
deberían ser considerados en la literatura acerca de la venta de votos. 
Estos factores estructurales son de los pocos observables sobre los cua-
les los compradores de votos basan su decisión acerca de si invertir en 
clientelismo o no. Usando datos de opinión pública y censos de Brasil, el 
trabajo examina las variaciones en rentas individuales dentro de diferen-
tes contextos de pobreza a nivel municipal. Los resultados sugieren que 
los partidos políticos emplean estrategias segmentadas o ad-hoc, apun-
tando a individuos cuando son altamente identificables, y a grupos cuan-
do se presentan situaciones de economías de escala. Además, individuos 
que no están en situación de pobreza también pueden recibir ofertas 
clientelares. 
Palabras clave: Brasil, clientelismo, venta de votos 
 
